产业组织理论：范围与大纲

Robert Evans (Cambridge University)
"Reputational Externality and Self-Regulation"

Professional associations and other producer groups often complain that
their reputation is damaged by other groups providing a similar but lower-
quality service and that the latter should be regulated. We examine the condi-
tions under which a common regulatory regime can induce Pareto-improvements
by creating a common reputation for quality among heterogeneous producers,
when the regulator cannot commit to a
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Mixed Oligopoly with Spatial Price Discrimination

Location Choice and Price Discrimination in a Duopoly

        Tommaso Valletti, 1999

This paper analyzes the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences over both a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). A model with two firms competing over locations and non-linear contracts is analyzed. Discriminatory contracts are first characterized at each location. It is then shown that locations have a big impact on the firms' discriminatory ability and that equilibri
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Does Large Price Discrimination Imply Great Market Power?

A simple model demonstrates that there is no theoretical connection between the extent of price discrimination and the extent of market power.

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

HOLLANDER and MACDISSI 2003

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/publications/etext/2003-02.pdf

The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area : new survey evidence

              Fabiani  et.al  2005

Advance Delivery Contracts. Revenue Pools and Price Discrimination

Hollander, A. and Fraser, C. 1986

This Paper Provides a Rationale for the Difference Between Contract and Spot Prices Which Is Not Based on Risk Aversion But on Price Discrimination. We Model the Behaviour of a Large Buyer Who Groups an Advance Delivery Contract for Part of His Requirements. His Remaining Purchases Are Executed on the Spot Market Which May Be Supplied Either by the Other Group Or by Both Groups. the Buyer Recoups the Premium Paid on Contracted Output Through a Lower Price on
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Perfect Price Discrimination is not So Perfect

Sara Hsu and David Kiefer 2005

The foundation of the accepted theory on two-part tariffs is the partial equilibrium analysis first developed by Oi (1971). He argues that the profit maximum obtains from a lump-sum payment (equal to the consumer surplus) plus a unit price (equal to marginal cost), and that the resulting allocation is Pareto efficient because it is identical to perfect competition (except for lump-sum transfers to the monopoly). He shows that this outcome is identical to first-degree price discrimi
……

Welfare and Output in Third-Degree Price Discrimination: a Note

Francisco Galera 2003

 this note I provide examples to show that, contrary to what is widely believed, when changing from an uniform price to a third-degree price discrimination situation, an improvement in welfare is possible with output reduction, if there is more than one firm.